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Board of Education of the Westside 
Community Schools v. Mergens: 
EQUAL ACCESS ACT ALLOWING 
A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT 
RELIGIOUS GROUP TO MEET ON 
SCHOOL PREMISES DURING 
NONINSTRUCTIONAL TIME 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
In Board of Education of the West-
side Community Schools v. Mergens, 
llO S. Ct. 2356 (1990), the Supreme 
Court held that the Equal Access Act 
("Act") prohibited a public high school 
from denying a student religious group 
permission to meet on school premises 
during noninstructional time. The 
Court based its decision on statutory 
interpretation of the Act and Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), which 
allowed university students to form a 
similar religious club. 
In 1985, a group of students led by 
Bridget Mergens met with Westside 
High School's principal and requested 
permission to form a Christian Bible 
Club at the school. The club was to have 
the same privileges and conditions as 
other Westside school groups, except 
that it would not have a faculty sponsor, 
such a sponsor would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. School officials denied 
the request, explaining that school 
policy required a faculty sponsor for all 
student clubs, and a religious club at a 
public high school would in itself violate 
the Establishment Clause. The school 
board upheld the denial. 
A suit seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief was brought by Westside stu-
dents in the United States District Court 
for the District of Nebraska. The stu-
dents argued that the denial violated the 
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.c. §§ 4071-
4074 (1984). The Act prohibits public 
secondary schools, which receive fed-
eral assistance and maintain a "limited 
open forum" from denying "equal ac-
cess" to students who wish to meet 
within the forum on the basis of the 
content of the speech at such meetings. 
Westside, llO S. Ct. at 2364 (citing 20 
U.S.c. § 4071(a)). 
The trial court determined that the Act 
did not apply in that all of the school's 
student clubs were curriculum-related 
and tied to the educational function of 
theschool.ld. at 2363. Therefore, West-
side did not have a "limited open forum" 
as defined by the Act. Id. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit reversed the district 
court's judgment. Id. The Court noted 
that many of Westside's student clubs 
were non-curriculum related and thus, 
the school maintained a "limited open 
forum." The court of appeals held that 
the Act applied and prohibited discrim-
ination against the students' proposed 
club on the basis of religiOUS content:ld. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision, holding that the school board 
violated the Equal Access Act in denying 
the students' religious club official 
recognition.ld. The Court also held that 
the Act, and its application to Westside, 
did not violate the Establishment Clause 
of the first amendment. Id. at 2373. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court's 
analysis was splintered. Three opinions 
and eight Justices agreed that the Act 
was not an unconstitutional establish-
ment of religion. 
The plurality opinion, delivered by 
Justice O'Connor, was an extension of 
the holding in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court 
held that public universities must offer 
student religious groups the same privi-
leges and conditions afforded other stu-
dent organizations. The ruling, however, 
suggested that a different analysis might 
be needed for younger, more impres-
sionable students below the college 
level. The Westside Court concluded 
that the analysis should apply to secon-
dary students. Westside, 110 S. Ct. at 
2371. 
The Court began its analysis by inter-
preting the language of the Act which 
states that whenever a public secondary 
school allows" one or more noncurricu-
lum related student groups to meet on 
school premises during noninstructional 
time," a "limited open forum" exists. Id. 
at 2364 (quoting 20 U.S.c. § 4071(b)). 
Although the Act did not explicitly 
define the phrase "noncurriculum re-
lated student group," the Court con-
cluded that such a group included any 
student group not directly related to the 
body of courses offered by the school. 
Id. at 2366. 
The Court then determined that West-
side permitted noncumculum-related 
student groups to meet after school on 
school premises. The Court noted that 
other groups, including a scuba diving 
club and a chess club, were not directly 
related to official school courses. There-
fore, because Westside permitted" one 
or more noncurriculum student groups 
to meet on school premises during non-
instructional time," the Court concluded 
that Westside maintained a "limited 
open forum." Id. at 2370. Thus, West-
side could not discriminate based on the 
content of the student's speech, and its 
refusal to grant recognition to the re-
ligious group constituted a denial of 
equal access to the school's limited 
open forum in violation of the Act. Id. 
The second step of the Court's analy-
sis focused on whether the Equal Access 
Act, on its face and as applied to West-
side, violated the Establishment Clause 
of the first amendment. In making its 
determination, the Court applied the 
three-prong test set out in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The 
Lemon test provided that an equal access 
law must have a secular purpose, that its 
primary effect may neither advance nor 
inhibit religion, and that it may not fos-
ter excessive governmental entangle-
ment with religion. Id. at 612-13. The 
Court relied on its application of the test 
to religious clubs at a state university 
level in Widmar, where the Court held 
that the" equal access" policy was not a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Westside, llO S. Ct. at 2370 (citing 
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75). The West-
side Court stated that the logic of Wid-
mar applied with "equal force to the 
Equal Access Act." Id. at 2371. 
First, the Court determined that the 
secular purpose prong of the test was 
satisfied in that the Act on its face grants 
equal access to both secular and reli-
gious speech. Id. The Court then deter-
mined that because the Act did not have 
the primary effect of advancing religion, 
the second prong of the test was also 
satisfied. The Court proposed that a 
"crucial difference" existed between 
government and private speech endors-
ing religion. Id. at 2732. The Court 
stated that "secondary school students 
are mature enough and are likely to 
understand that a school does not en-
dorse or support student speech that it 
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory 
basis." Id. Furthermore, the Act avoided 
the problem of student emulation of 
teachers as role models and mandatory 
attendance requirements, which might 
indicate official endorsement, by ex-
pressly limiting the participation of 
school officials at student religious club 
meetings. The Court recognized that 
the possibility of student peer pressure 
would still remain, however, this pres-
sure presented little risk of official en-
dorsement or coercion because no for-
mal classroom activities were involved 
and school officials could not actively 
participate. [d. 
Finally, applying the Lemon entangle-
ment prong, the Court concluded that 
the school did not risk excessive entan-
glement by complying with the Act. The 
Act prohibited faculty monitors from 
participating in the meetings, as well as 
non-school persons from directing or 
regularly attending the student religious 
meetings. Moreover, school "sponsor-
ship" of religious meetings was pro-
hibited. [d. The Court again relied on 
Widmar, stating that a denial of equal 
access might create greater entangle-
ment problems through invasive moni-
toring to prevent religious speech at 
such meetings. [d. Accordingly, the 
Court held that the Equal Access Act did 
not violate the Establishment Clause. [d. 
Two concurring opinions expressed a 
different establishment premise. Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the incidental 
benefits realized by allowing official 
recognition of a student religiOUS club 
did not lead to an establishment of reli-
gion. He stated that nothing on the face 
of the Act or the Westside facts dem-
onstrated the presence of pressure to 
participate in the religious club. [d. at 
2376-77 (Kennedy,]., concurring). Jus-
tice Marshall offered a more cautious 
opinion, stating that the school must 
"fully disassociate" itself from the club's 
religious speech, activities, and goals. In 
his view, the school must also avoid the 
appearance of sponsoring or endorsing 
the club's goals. [d. at 2378 (Marshall,]., 
concurring). 
The Supreme Court's holding in West-
side will have an immediate impact on 
this country's school systems. Some 
school districts have waited for the West-
side opinion before deciding whether to 
approve similar after-school student 
clubs. Now, student religious groups 
can demand equal access without fear of 
violating the first amendment. 
- Scot D. Morrell 
Hodgson fJ. Minnesota: STATE 
ABORTION LAW REQUIRING 
TWO-PARENT NOTIFICATION 
PRIOR TO A MINOR'S OBTAIN-
ING AN ABORTION IS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL IF A JUDICIAL 
BYPASS PROCEDURE IS 
PROVIDED 
In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 
2926 ( 1990), the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
Minnesota statute requiring that a preg-
nant minor notify both of her parents 
before having an abortion. Although the 
Court found the notification require-
ment itself to be unconstitutional, the 
statute as a whole was saved because it 
provided the alternative of bypassing such 
notice by obtaining judicial approval. 
The Minnesota statute provided that, 
with certain exceptions, an abortion 
could not be performed on a woman 
under 18 years of age until at least 48 
hours after both of her parents were 
notified. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2930. 
This notice was mandatory unless 1) the 
attending physician certified the neces-
sity of an immediate abortion to prevent 
the woman's death, 2) both of her par-
ents had consented to the abortion in 
writing, or 3) the minor declared that 
she was a victim of parental abuse or 
neglect and notice of her declaration . 
was given to the proper authorities. [d. 
The statute provided that if the court 
enjoined the enforcement of the paren-
tal notice requirement, the same require-
ment would be effective unless the 
pregnant woman obtained a court order 
permitting the abortion. [d. To acquire 
such a court order, the minor had to 
convince a judge either that she was 
"mature and capable of giving informed 
consent" to the abortion or that an abor-
tion without notice to both parents 
would be in her best interests. [d. at 
2932-33. 
A group consisting of pregnant minors, 
clinics, doctors, and the mother of a 
pregnant minor challenged the statute 
by filing suit in district court. The group 
alleged that the statute violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses of 
the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 2934. 
The district court found both the two-
parent notification requirement and the 
48-hour waiting period to be invalid, 
and therefore concluded that the statute 
was unconstitutional in its entirety and 
enjoined its enforcement. [d. The 
United States Court of Appeals, sitting 
en banc, reversed. The court determined 
that the two-parent notification re-
quirement was unconstitutional unless, 
as in this case, a judicial bypass proce-
dure was prOvided. [d. at 2935. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed. The Court held that the two-
parent notification requirement was 
not reasonably related to legitimate state 
interests and was therefore unconstitu-
tional, but agreed that the bypass pro-
cedure saved the statute as a whole. [d. 
at 2947. 
The Court began its analysis by rec-
ognizing that the due process clause's 
constitutional protection against unjus-
tified state intrusion into a woman's 
decision whether to bear a child ex-
tended to pregnant minors. [d. (citing 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52 (1976». Since the Minnesota 
statute placed obstacles in the pregnant 
minor's path to an abortion, the state 
had the burden of establishing its consti-
tutionality; to wit, that the obstacles im-
posed were reasonably related to legit-
imate state interests. [d .. 
In considering the constitutionality of 
the notification requirement, the Court 
recognized that similar statutes contain-
ing parental consent or notification re-
quirements had previously been evalu-
ated by the Court and were determined 
to be constitutional. The Court noted, 
however, that none of these cases had 
considered the significance of requiring 
the notification of two parents, rather 
than only one. [d. at 2938. Thus, the 
Court focused its analysis on this dis-
tinction. 
In defending the statute, the state 
relied primarily on the state's interest in 
protecting the independent right of 
parents "to determine and strive for 
what they believe to be best for their 
children," and not on the best interests 
of the minor. [d. at 2946. While the 
Court recognized that such an interest 
may be legitimate, it found that it would 
be fully served by a requirement that the 
minor notify one parent. [d. at 2945. 
The Court determined that in func-
tioning families, where the parents com-
municate with each other, notice to one 
parent would normally constitute notice 
to both and the two-parent notification 
requirement would therefore be unnec-
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